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By Abdul Azim Islahi
 
The economics of information is one of the recent developments in the area of economic 
theory. Its use in the field of Islamic banking and finance is widely discussed. But there is still 
a lack of empirical studies. The authors should undoubtedly be commended for producing a 
thought-provoking chapter on the subject. They have presented empirical evidence from the 
experience of the Agricultural Bank of Iran (ABI) showing that a reduction in information 
asymmetry and increased monitoring by the ABI led to the preference of variable return 
instruments (VRIs) such as musharakah, mudarabah over the fixed return instruments (FRIs), 
like murabahah, ijarah, bay' al-salam, and so on. According to the authors, with increased 
supervision   and   monitoring,   information   asymmetry   is   minimized   and   under   such 
circumstances it is not efficient for the financial intermediary to lend on the basis of debt. The 
extra cost of information generation, supervision and monitoring is to be considered an 
investment, which entails selection of superior projects and an efficient allocation of 
resources. The theoretical part of the chapter should not detain us long, as considerable 
discussion has already taken place on this issue and a good deal of literature has come out on 
financial intermediation and asymmetrical information. The importance of the chapter lies in 
its empirical evidence. The authors seem to accept and strive to verify the thesis that banks 
prefer fixed return instruments (FRIs) because they minimize the information requirement of 
a financial contract when the performance of the project is not observable by the financial 
institution, and that reduction of information asymmetry is a prerequisite for implementation 
of an equity-based system (or variable return instruments, VRIs). But this assertion is 
contested by the classical example of the used-car market. Informational asymmetry in the 
used-car market, being a one-time relation between the buyer and seller, is much more prone 
to moral hazard than an equity contract. But the fact that the market for used cars exists 
should be enough to prove that mere informational asymmetry could not be an obstacle in the 
way of equity-based contracts. It may be noted that the seller of a used car is absolved of any 
obligation if any defect is found in the car after the sale, whereas the bank's client will be held 
responsible if it is discovered that the loss is his fault.
 
Coming to the empirical part of the chapter, the authors argue that the ABI achieved 
symmetric information through investment in supervision and monitoring and expenditure on 
research and development. Due to overcoming the problem of moral hazard through 
information-sharing and monitoring, the share of equity participation (musharakah) in its 
portfolio increased substantially. They have attributed this to the decrease in the average 
number of steps and time that the ABI takes to conclude a contract, a relative increase in the 
share of musharakah over time, and to the composition of outstanding facilities extended to the non-public-sector by Islamic banks. I feel that the data given are not sufficient to 
substantiate the point that the authors wanted to make.
 
The authors have repeatedly emphasized that the ABI's investment in supervision and 
monitoring resulted in greater benefits. However, it is not clear what the volume of 
investment was for this purpose and as a result what benefits or returns it could derive. Had 
the authors shown the total costs in procurement of information and monitoring by ABI, and 
the resultant increase in its revenue, it would have been more convincing that these 
information costs were not a deadweight loss to society.
 
According to the authors, the major shift in the ABI's portfolio during the last 15 years was 
towards musharakah, because of eliminating the problems of chances of moral hazard. But it 
should be noted that out of the two equity-based contracts, musharakah and mudarabah, the 
former is the least vulnerable to moral hazard as in this case both partners contribute both 
capital and labour and the bank has a right to interfere. At a later stage the authors themselves 
accept that the shift in the ABI's portfolio towards an increased share of musharakah cannot 
be attributed solely to increased monitoring and supervision but also to a number of other 
factors. Had they argued that the increasing share of mudarabah (pure equity participation) 
was due to achievement of more symmetric information, their argument might have been 
more convincing. But the chapter is silent on any 'procedural change about mudarabah to 
save steps, time, and expense for the bank's partners'.
 
The chapter gives the impression that the dominance of mark-up and other fixed-return 
instruments in the early days of the ABI after implementation of the Interest Free Banking 
Law in 1983, and still in other commercial banks, has been due only to information 
asymmetry and fear of moral hazard. But that is probably not absolutely correct. It might 
have been due to their need for liquidity. The mudarabah and musharakah market is less 
liquid unless a secondary stock market also exists. Moreover, different Islamic instruments 
have their own characteristics and advantages. FRIs such as murabahah, ijarah, and bay' al-
salam have an advantage over VRls such as mudarabah and musharakah, because the former 
can be utilized for meeting end-use purposes such as household consumption needs, the 
purchase of durable goods, machinery, tools, equipment and the like, whereas the latter 
cannot. The authors consider moral hazard as an inevitable consequence of asymmetric 
information. Many studies have shown that this is effective only when principals and agents 
have a one-time relation. In a permanent and perpetual contract, with a competition for scarce 
capital, it will be eliminated. Similarly, a small or one man firm may capitalize on relative 
informational advantage. But this is less likely when a firm is a legal entity. It is for the same 
reason that moral hazard problems do not prevent people from depositing their savings with 
Islamic banks on a purely equity basis. It will be advisable to check whether there is any 
advantage from changing the condition of borrowers from small to big or from a one-time 
relation to a repetitive contractual relation in the changing capital structure of the ABI.
 
Another important factor that may eliminate the occurrence of moral hazard in spite of 
asymmetrical information is the prevalence of ethical values and moral commitments. If 
Islamic morality is fostered, the standard of expected behaviour will improve, covenants in 
the written contracts will be honoured, business records will be accurate, and monitoring 
costs will eventually fall. Thus, developments of equity contracts in the ABI may not be 
wholly due to investment in control and supervision. It may be, to a great extent, due to 
prevalence of ethical atmosphere. 
If we allow for an honest world, the moral hazard problem, which introduces the deadweight 
cost in the variable return instruments, may be eliminated. The fact that ethical and moral 
changes in the society led to the increasing participation by the ABI is clear from the authors' 
own statement that even after destruction of all records in the Iraq-Iran War, the farmers 
themselves provided such records and 'all willingly submitted a copy of their own contracts to 
the bank ... from which their debt could be worked out and collected'.
 
The authors' claim that, along with investment in supervision and monitoring, the ABI also 
maintained   a   balanced   and   well-diversified   portfolio   encompassing   a   wide   range   of 
instruments. But Table 7.2 shows that more than two-thirds of capital was invested in 
musharakah and mudarabah. This cannot be considered to be a balanced portfolio. The other 
Islamic banks invested in ten types of instruments while the ABI was confined to seven. 
Interestingly, the instruments of  muzara`ah  (sharecropping), and  musaqah  (fruit sharing), 
especially for the agriculture sector, do not figure in the ABI's portfolio at all.